Investments in …rm-speci…c human capital have come to play a central role in the value creation for most companies and organisations as job tasks have become ever more complex and demanding to carry out. Today successful performance of essential job tasks often necessitates highly specialised knowledge and skills, thus requiring continuous updating of employee competences. This paper develops a two-period agency model to show how the threat of layo¤ (outsourcing of job tasks to a third party supplier) can help a company trigger or ease employee investments in …rm-speci…c human capital by creating explicit career concerns for the individual employee. Results are provided under long-term as well as short-term contracting regimes. In particular, the paper has relevance for companies operating under short-term contracting where investments in …rm-speci…c human capital might be pro…table yet very di¢ cult or even impossible to induce.
Introduction
Resource-based theory suggests that a key element to ensure long-term company pro…tability is an ongoing focus on what resources to use and how to combine these most e¤ectively to exploit their full potential (Wernerfelt 1984) . In many companies the most important resources are human by nature, which naturally relates …rm prosperity to the knowledge and skills held by the employees (Becker 1964; Spender and Grant 1996) . Sometimes these capabilities can be combined and codi…ed into intellectual assets like inventions and technologies that can be claimed as property by the company. At other times it is impossible, or very costly and di¢ cult, to materialise human capabilities, for which reason their value-creating potential remains with the individual worker and can only be used at his discretion (Edvinsson and Sullivan 1996; Kogut and Zander 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1994) . Still, however, such non-codi…ed knowledge and skills can generate value through reinforcement of essential processes within the company.
Whether knowledge and skills can be codi…ed or not, learning is essential because it is a precondition for value creation that the employees acquire the necessary know-how to master and develop the company's intellectual assets or reinforce company processes. Some required capabilities are non-idiosyncratic and widely available in the labour market as they can be acquired by any worker prior to joining a particular …rm (e.g. school training). Yet, if competition is …erce, competitiveness and thus pro…tability can best be ensured by focusing company activities around superior resources that are unique and di¢ cult for competitors to imitate (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Barney 1991) . That is, only through such resources is it possible to obtain a low cost position in the market (Ricardian rents) or lower competition by di¤erentiating company products from the rest of the market (monopoly rents) (Peteraf 1993) . Consequently, …rm-speci…c learning (on-the-job training) needs to take place inside the company after the worker has been hired. For example, the pro…t potential of Since learning cannot be enforced by the company, it can merely try to encourage learning implicitly through carefully designed incentive mechanisms that make it attractive for the employee to acquire …rm-speci…c capabilities. One way to induce such long-term actions is by providing job security for the worker, which can be attained through long-term contracts where the company commits to a given compensation in future periods at the time of contract initiation (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 363) . By doing so, the employee no longer needs to worry about dismissal or forced salary cuts as a consequence of being locked in when undertaking investments in …rm-speci…c human capital. In particular, if the salary in future periods partly depends on how productive the worker is, and productivity can be in ‡uenced positively by improving skills and knowledge, long-term engagements naturally motivate the employee to upgrade his competence level.
However, not all companies can operate under long-term contracts but instead have to rely on short-term engagements. For example, it is not di¢ cult to imagine a company that for strategic reasons needs to keep the cost structure ‡exible and thus contracts with a part of the employees on a short-term basis in order to make periodical salary adjustments possible. Likewise, a company might be interested in minimising employee shirking through the disciplining e¤ect of ongoing performance evaluation that, contrary to long-term engagements, is naturally embedded in short-term contracts (Anderhub et al. 2003) . Still, even under such conditions it may be in the company's best interest that …rm-speci…c learning takes place, since company performance may then be enhanced due to increased productivity ex post the competence investment. The problem is, however, that short-term contracting does not eliminate the risk related to the worker's investment in …rm-speci…c human capital as it makes it non-credible for the company to commit to compensations in future periods. Thus, if em-ployee competences can be observed, a rational company will try to exploit the worker's in ‡exibility ex post the investment and enforce a salary cut that leaves the employee with little or no expected value of his competence improvement. In total, this might eliminate the worker's incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c capabilities when taking into consideration the negative e¤ect that learning has on short-run productivity.
One way to incentivise the worker to take given actions even under short-term contracting can be found in the literature on labour economics where the disciplining e¤ect of unemployment has been studied (Calvo 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) . The basic idea in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is that if no unemployment exists and all workers receive the market wage, the worst that can happen to a worker not exhibiting the right behaviour (e.g. shirking) is getting …red. However, since he can immediately be rehired at the market wage, he pays no penalty for his misdemeanour and has no incentive to behave well. With unemployment the situation changes; even if all …rms pay the same wages, a worker has an incentive to behave correctly because if he is laid o¤, no other job is immediately available. Therefore, the equilibrium unemployment rate must be large enough to make it worthwhile for workers to undertake actions that are in the company's best interest and avoid dismissal.
Another way to provide the worker with incentive to undertake certain actions, which is of particular interest to the present paper, can be found in the literature on career concerns, also known as implicit market-driven incentives (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Dewatripont et al. 1999a Dewatripont et al. , 1999b Holmström 1999) . Typically, career concerns arise when the (internal or external) labour market settles future compensation to re ‡ect employee ability but neither the worker's skill level nor his productive e¤ort is observable. Yet, output can be observed and so the market uses this to update its belief about the worker's ability in order to apply this revised expectation to determine future wages. As a result, the worker wants to take advantage of e¤ort being unobservable, in an attempt to increase output and thus in ‡uence the market's belief about talent. 1 Motivated by the importance of …rm-speci…c human capital in many employment relationships and intrigued by the use of unemployment and career concerns as incentive mechanisms, I set out to formally study how outsourcing can be used as a possible device to overcome incentive problems of investing in competence improvement under varying contract regimes. Assuming that capabilities are observable and no immediate rent yielding job positions are available after layo¤, the simple idea is that the mere threat of outsourcing makes the employee concerned with unemployment, which induces him to take …rm-speci…c long-term actions. As such, this partly resembles the idea from Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) of using unemployment as a disciplining device, although the concern of the present paper is not with analysing the dynamics or equilibrium e¤ects in the labour market. Instead the centre of attention is kept on the employment relationship after a particular worker has been selected but before any investment in …rm-speci…c human capital has been made or compensation contracts have been formally established. Put di¤erently, my analysis concentrates on how outsourcing can trigger or ease the undertaking of competence improvement within the employment relationship by forcing the worker, when maximising his utility, to explicitly consider how attractive a certain investment in …rm-speci…c human capital makes him in the eyes of the company. In this respect, the incentive to signal attractiveness bears certain similarities to the typical career concern model. However, while the underlying mechanism may be the same, my proposed setup di¤ers from the standard modelling of career concerns in two important ways. First, the worker's ability is not a constant but can indeed be improved by the worker's own behaviour if he spends time on learning. Second, the worker's competence level will be fully revealed to the company, and so what drives future wages is not the observed output but in fact the observed ability, since this partially determines whether the worker will be laid o¤ or allowed to continue production.
In particular, I initially concentrate on an employment relationship based on long-term contracts to provide a benchmark for my subsequent analysis of short-term contracting. I thus show how the company can regulate (strengthen or weaken) the worker's incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital through commitment to a given compensation structure ex post the investment. Following this, I demonstrate why outsourcing ‡ex-ibility can be alluring for the company to bring about even under long-term contracting as it comprises two potentially value creating e¤ects; a real option e¤ect and a behavioural e¤ect. The real option e¤ect sets in as the external supplier alternative reduces the dependence on in-house learning if the company can choose the severance fee paid to the worker at dismissal without constraints. The behavioural e¤ect is coined through the worker's incentive to stay attractive to the company and avoid layo¤. Hence, if the rent from continued in-house production is lucrative to the worker, the mere introduction of an outsourcing alternative may incentivise him to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital to signal attractiveness to the company and avoid layo¤. In consequence, introducing outsourcing ‡exibility is not necessary to induce a certain investment in …rm-speci…c human capital under long-term contracts, yet it holds the potential for the company to induce the investment at a lower cost than under no outsourcing.
The second part of this article studies short-term contracting. Initially, I show how this contracting regime leaves the employee with no incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital if competences can be observed. Speci…cally, since the company cannot credibly commit to any future contracts, it will always exploit the …rm-speci…city of the worker's investment and enforce a salary cut ex post the competence improvement that reduces the value of the …rm-speci…c investment to zero. As such, this can be harmful to the company if learning is productive. I thus demonstrate how the company can bene…t from introducing outsourcing ‡exibility into the setting to create explicit career concerns for the employee and make him undertake long-term actions to signal attractiveness and maintain production in-house. That is, although future compensation will be adjusted by the company to o¤set the e¤ect of …rm-speci…c investments under short-term contracting, there are still rents to be collected by the worker if not dismissed. Consequently, compared to full commitment the introduction of outsourcing ‡exibility is absolutely necessary to encourage a positive investment in …rm-speci…c human capital under short-term contracting. I close this second part with some example-based re ‡ections on the value of the outsourcing ‡exibility to both the company and the employee. My …nal section concludes the paper.
Full commitment 2.1 The basic model without outsourcing ‡exibility
In what follows I will consider a company setting lasting for two periods and consisting of a risk neutral principal (the manager or company) and a risk neutral agent with limited liability (the employee). For the purpose of illustration, I will let the agent be the company's sole productive resource and assume that he possesses two basic capabilities; a physical productive ability and an intellectual capacity to learn. As such, the physical productive ability makes the employee able to produce the company's output while the intellectual capacity provides the employee with an opportunity to acquire certain …rm-speci…c skills regarding company processes and best practice that can complement and amplify the e¤ect of using the physical productive ability.
Under full commitment the principal at t = 0 contracts with the agent for production of the stochastic output x 1 2 fx L ; x H g in period 1 andx 2 2 fx L ; x H g in period 2 where x = x H x L > 0.
2
The output in period 1 is a¤ected by the level and composition of the agent's e¤ort. As such, the agent's e¤ort can take on two levels, e 1 2 fe L ; e H g with e H > e L 0, which can be further divided into physical productive effort, a 0, and skill improvement (investment in …rm-speci…c human capital), h 0. Mathematically, I assume that the probability of realising the high output (upstate), x H , in period 1 is given by ' 1 ( x H j e 1 ; h) = (e 1 h)
1=2
while the probability of realising the low output (downstate) is ' 1 ( x L j e 1 ; h) = 1 (e 1 h) 1=2 . Intuitively, this implies that the more e¤ort the agent exerts, the greater is the chance of realising the high outcome. However, should the agent choose to spend time on skill improvement, this will diminish the probability of realising the high outcome, since investing in …rm-speci…c human capital is assumed non-productive during period 1. Moreover, I assume that putting forth e¤ort does not come without cost, for which reason the agent su¤ers a personal cost of 1 = 0 or 1 = H > 0 when exerting e L or e H , respectively. Finally, at the end of period 1 the output, x 1 , is realised and since this output is the only contractable variable in period 1, this determines the agent's payment, c 1 . As such, c 1 can never be negative due to the agent's limited liability.
All told, the agent's expected utility in period 1 conditional on e 1 and h takes the following form
Likewise, if the revenue from production is assumed to be net of production cost, the principal only explicitly incurs the compensation cost to the agent and faces the following expected pro…t conditional on e 1 and h.
To keep the model tractable in period 2, I continue the simplicity from period 1 and assume that the agent's e¤ort can take on the same two levels, e 2 2 fe L ; e H g. This time, however, further skill improvement is pointless for which reason the agent only directs his e¤ort towards physical production. Additionally, the agent bene…ts from his investment in …rm-speci…c human capital; the probability of receiving the high output in period 2 is ' 2 ( x H j e 2 ; h) = e 1=2 2 (1 + h) while the probability of receiving the low output is ' 2 ( x L j e 2 ; h) = 1 e 1=2 2 (1 + h) for any given h 0. With regard to the speci…c structure of the probability function, the parameter determines how productive …rm-speci…c human capital is in period 2 and thus how much investing in …rm-speci…c human capital increases the likelihood of realising the upstate. Moreover, for h = 0 the probabilities in period 1 and 2 are identical; if no investment is made in …rm-speci…c human capital and the same amount of e¤ort is put forth in each period, the probability of realising the upstate is the same in both periods. In continuation of this, I make the special assumption that the principal can only establish a compensation programme in period 2 that is independent of the realised period 1 compensation. Again, I assume that the agent su¤ers a personal cost in period 2 of 2 = 0 or 2 = H > 0 when exerting e L or e H , respectively.
In total, this provides the agent with the following expected utility, E U N O 2 e 2 ; h in period 2 when no outsourcing ‡exibility exists (NO)
while the principal's pro…t under full contract commitment and no outsourcing in period 2 is given by
Figure 1 below outlines the sequence of events in the model.
• 
Analysis under full commitment and no outsourcing ‡exibility
Initially, I will consider what will be termed the benchmark situation where outsourcing is not possible and long-term contracts can be established. I assume that x is su¢ ciently large to provide the principal with incentive to induce the high e¤ort level in each period, i.e. (e 1 ; e 2 ) = (e H ; e H ). First I will concentrate on deriving the optimal level of …rm-speci…c human capital in …rst-best. Subsequently, I will focus on second-best and determine how the principal will select the compensation structure in each period to maximise his pro…t.
First-best
In …rst-best (FB) no incentive problem exists for which reason the principal at t = 0 sets
= 0, and maximises his pro…t by choosing h
The principal only wants the agent to take long-term action if it increases the expected pro…t and so I initially evaluate @E N O =@h at h = 0 to determine what makes …rm-speci…c human capital valuable.
That is, e H > 1=2 represents the necessary condition to make learning favourable to the principal. Conversely, this also implies that investing in …rm-speci…c human capital can be a bad to the principal when e H 1=2.
Thus, in …rst-best the principal induces the agent to improve his skill level, h N O F B > 0, if this increases the total likelihood of a good outcome (e H > 1=2). On the other hand, if learning is unproductive (e H 1=2), the principal selects h N O F B = 0 and induces the agent to only focus on exerting short-term productive e¤ort. In relation to this, I also notice that the more productive …rm-speci…c human capital is (the higher is), the more the principal wants the agent to invest in skill improvement.
Second-best
Having determined the …rst-best investment in …rm-speci…c human capital, I turn to the second-best situation (SB) where information asymmetry between the principal and the agent exists. In second-best the principal at t = 0 chooses the compensation plan in period 1 and 2 to ensure that the agent's participation contraint (PC) and incentive compatibility constraints (IC's) are all satis…ed and lead the agent to pick the levels of e¤ort and …rm-speci…c human capital that maximise pro…t. To study this optimisation problem, I will initially establish how the compensation programme in period 1 and 2 can be set to always satisfy the PC and IC's. The reason is that this simpli…es the notation in relation to the subsequent derivations. Following this, I will focus on the agent to show how he can be given incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. Moreover, I will derive how he settles his investment in …rm-speci…c human capital in second-best (reponse function). Finally, I will turn to the principal's actual maximisation problem.
Consider …rst E U N O HH where the agent picks (e 1 ; e 2 ) = (e H ; e H ) and E U N O e1e2 that in this case represents the expected utility for all other combinations of e 1 and e 2 4 E U
From (6) and (7), it is evident that the principal can always select c 1L = c 2L = 0 and pick c 1H and
and thus the IC's, since the agent cares only about the di¤erence in compensation in each period (the bonus). Moreover, by doing so, the PC is automatically satis…ed as
With this in mind, I will turn to investigate how the agent's investment in …rm-speci…c human capital changes for given levels of e¤ort and compensation, since this a¤ects the principal's actual choice of compensation and allows for comparison with the …rst-best level of …rm-speci…c human capital. Hence, I will derive the agent's response function for h as a function of e 1 ; e 2 ; c 1H and c 2H . My results are summarised in proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 (Worker) (I) If the company can commit to the second-period contract, the worker can be given incentives to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. (II) Increasing (Decreasing) the bonus paid while skill-improvement takes place, c 1H , weakens (strengthens) the incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. Increasing (decreasing) the bonus paid after productive skills have been acquired, c 2H , strengthens (weakens) the incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital.
Proof. (I):
Knowing the compensation in both periods, the agent maximises his expected utility by choosing h N O e1e2 at t = 0 for any combination of e¤orts (e 1 ; e 2 ) and compensations (c 1H ; c 2H ).
Evaluating the derivative at h = 0 provides insight into the agent's incentive to invest in h
4 Notice that the notation h N O HH represents the level of …rm-speci…c human capital under no outsourcing (NO) when the agent picks the high e¤ort level, e H , in both periods (HH). Moreover, if the levels of e¤ort in either period, (e 1 ; e 2 ), are left unspeci…ed, this will be denoted
That is, if the principal at t = 0 can commit to a compensation structure where c 2H > 1= (2 ) e 1=2 1 e 1=2 2 c 1H , the agent can be given incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. This completes the argument for (I).
e1e2 represents a concave problem with the following solution
e1e2 characterises the agent's investment in …rm-speci…c human capital for given combinations of e¤orts and compensations in each period. The higher the compensation in period 1 is, the lower will be the agent's investment in learning. This is due to the fact that increasing the salary in period 1 makes it less lucrative to invest in h, since skill improvement is counterproductive in period 1 and reduces the probability of realising the high outcome. Increasing the compensation in period 2, however, has the opposite e¤ect as h is productive in period 2 and makes it more likely to achieve the high outcome. This concludes the argument for (II).
Given these results for the agent, I am ready to state the principal's overall constrained maximisation problem in second-best to analyse how the compensation in each period will be settled.
LL can all be calculated on the basis of equation (8) for respective combinations of e¤ort levels e 1 ; e 2 and compensation levels c 1H ; c 2H . On the basis of (9), I will prove proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 (Company) (I) If …rm-speci…c human capital is counterproductive to the company, this equates the …rst period bonus, c 1H , with the second period bonus, c 2H , and realises no investment in skill improvement (…rst-best), h N O HH = 0. (II) If …rm-speci…c human capital is productive to the company, the …rst period bonus, c 1H , will be set lower than the second period bonus, c 2H , and an investment in …rm-speci…c human capital that is larger than …rst-best will be realised, h
Proof. (I): If long-term actions are unproductive (e H 1=2), the principal wants to induce h N O HH = 0 all things being equal. From (8) this can be ensured if the principal selects identical compensations in both periods, c 1H = c 2H . The question then becomes whether this compensation policy maximises the principal's pro…t and induces the agent to exert the high e¤ort level in both periods. To establish that this in fact is the case, I check to see if the IC's are all satis…ed. As such, it can be noticed that h
HH . Assuming that IC1 is binding (and thus satis…ed), I …nd for
in particular. Finally, rearranging IC3 and inserting c 1H = c 2H =
show that IC3 is satis…ed
To see that c 1H = c 2H also maximises the principal's pro…t, I only need to observe that choosing c 2H > c 1H in (8) potentially induces the agent to pick h N O HH > 0; which can never be optimal given that …rm-speci…c human capital is assumed counterproductive. Similarly, selecting c 1H > c 2H only reduces the agent's incentive to undertake learning even further, which can never be optimal since c 1H = c 2H already ensures h (II): If long-term actions are productive (e H > 1=2) to the principal, no closed formed solution to the maximisation problem in (9) can be derived. Yet, the following argument can be made: assume that c 1H c 2H and look at the compensation variation c var 1H
c 1H "; c 2H . Inserting this variation into (8) provides us with the following level of …rm-speci…c human capital
Inserting (10) into the principal's pro…t (9) and rearranging the terms give
Taking the …rst order derivative of E N O wrt. " and evaluating this at " = 0 give (note that the positive sign follows from c 1H c 2H )
Intuitively, if " increases and hence the period 1 compensation, c var 1H , decreases, the principal's pro…t, E N O , will increase.
Next, consider the agent's utility, E U N O e1e2 and insert (10)
Taking the …rst order derivative E U
Rewriting (11) for each combination of e¤ort (e 1 ; e 2 ) and evaluating this at " = 0 give
Consequently, when " increases and thus the period 1 compensation, c var 1H , decreases, the decrease in E [U e H ;e H ] will always be smaller than or equal to the
That is, if the IC's are satis…ed for c 1H c 2H , this will also be the case for c var 1H < c 2H .
Since the principal's pro…t increases when c var 1H decreases and the IC's are still satis…ed, the principal will select c var 1H < c 2H . As a result of this, the level of …rm-speci…c human capital will increase above …rst-best.
This concludes the proof for (II).
In conclusion, I have shown that under full commitment the agent can be given incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital by adjusting the compensation in period 1 and 2 (c 1H and c 2H ) properly (proposition 1). Additionally, I have proved that the principal can always arrive at the …rst-best level of …rm-speci…c human capital by equating c 1H and c 2H . However, he will only do so in second-best if …rm-speci…c human capital is counterproductive, since this is the cheapest way of ensuring h N O HH = 0. If …rm-speci…c human capital is productive, it will always be optimal for the principal to choose c 1H < c 2H and realise a higher investment in …rm-speci…c human capital in second-best than in …rst-best, h N O HH > h F B (proposition 2). The intuition is that the principal expectedly saves more from lowering the period 1 compensation than is lost from inducing a …rm-speci…c investment that is above …rst-best when taking into consideration the agent's reaction pattern.
Extended model: Introducing outsourcing ‡exibility
Having characterised the benchmark situation, I extend the basic setup and introduce an external third party supplier with whom the company can contract at t = 1 for production in period 2 if it sees …t to do so. The reason for the company establishing an alternative to internal production can be grounded in two distinct potentially value-creating e¤ects. First, outsourcing ‡exibility naturally represents a real option to the company as it enables the company to avoid situations where expected in-house production in period 2 is bad; the more lucrative the outsourcing alternative is the higher the value of the real option is. Second, the outsourcing ‡exibility may make it easier and thereby cheaper to incentivise the worker to undertake long-term actions and invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. These two e¤ects will thus be the centre of analysis in the following where special attention will be given to the employee's problem since the complexity of the company's constrained maximisation problem leaves no room for meaningful comparative statics.
Formally, I will suppose that the principal at t = 1 is given the ‡exibility to dismiss the worker in return for a proper severance fee, , settled at t = 0, if the expected pro…tability can be improved by contracting with the third party supplier in period 2. For this reason, I assume that the external contractor o¤ers a pricẽ p U (0; 1) so that the distribution hereof is known to both the principal and the agent at t = 0 while the actual value is not realised and observed before t = 1.
5 Additionally, the principal conducts an interview with the agent at t = 1 to learn his type (i.e. his current skill level), h, since this provides the principal with insight about the expected pro…tability of maintaining production in-house. To make the model tractable, I continue the simplicity from the basic setup and extend the notation with an outsourcing scenario only. As such, the probability of realising the high output if production is contracted out is not a¤ected by any factors inside the model but simply given by the constant . Altogether, this implies that the agent's expected utility in period 2 from outsourcing (O) is
while the expected pro…t to the principal can be expressed as
Figure 2 below outlines the sequence of events in the model when outsourcing is introduced.
• Agent chooses 1 e and h
• γ is determined
• Distribution of price offer is known behave as a function of h and p, respectively. For this reason, I start out by 5 Notice that it can be problematic to assume that p U (0; 1) if the output levels in period 2, x 2L and x 2H , are very high, since this might create a situation where outsourcing is always the preferred alternative. A solution to this could be to model p U (0; p). However, to maintain simplicity this has been abandoned. Instead I will assume that the output levels in period 2 are never so high as to always render the outsourcing alternative favourable. rewriting (4) using c 2L = 0 from (6)
Equation ( 
Hence, the probability at t = 0 of the principal selecting outsourcing at t = 1 can now be expressed as the probability at t = 0 of the observed price o¤er p from the third party supplier at t = 1 being less than p 0 , i.e.
0 1 1 0 dp
Figure 3 below illustrates these arguments. (h). Contrarily, for p p 0 observed, the principal will choose in-house production since
Analysis under full commitment and outsourcing ‡exibility
Having analysed what makes the principal choose outsourcing at t = 1, I am ready to study what characterises the optimal investment in …rm-speci…c human capital when outsourcing is possible. Again I will thus divide the analysis into two parts, …rst-best and second-best, and compare my …ndings to the case of no outsourcing. In relation to second-best, I will additionally show how the period 2 compensation and the severance fee can be combined to provide the agent with incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital.
First-best
In order to examine the characteristics of the optimal investment in …rm-speci…c human capital under outsourcing, I initially derive the principal's objective function
h; e H dp
) dp
Intuitively, 1=2p 2 0 in (17) represents the real option value of the outsourcing ‡exibility compared to the case of no outsourcing; if the principal can choose the severance fee, , unreservedly he can always arrive at the scenario without the ‡exibility by choosing so large that p 0 = 0. This is summed up in (I) in proposition 3 below.
In …rst-best the principal selects c 1L = c 1H = c 2L = c 2H = H and = 0 and maximises (17) by choosing h
The …rst-order condition wrt. h is 
where @p
is complicated and does not bring much insight. Instead, the intuition is clear from (18); it is optimal for the principal to increase the agent's investment in …rm-speci…c human capital as long as the expected decrease in period 1 rent is more than countered by an increase in the period 2 rent. Furthermore, comparing (18) to …rst-best under no outsourcing in (5),
x, reveals how the real option value of the outsourcing ‡exibility a¤ects the level of …rm-speci…c human capital. That is, p in period 1 since this increases the expected pro…t in period 1 (i.e. the probability of pro…ting from learning in period 2 is reduced). Finally, if long-term actions are unproductive (e H 1=2) to the principal, he will continue to select h 
Second-best
When leaving …rst-best, the incentives are no longer necessarily aligned, which requires the agent's incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraint to be satis…ed. Thus, at t = 0 the agent has to decide how much e¤ort to exert in each period and how much e¤ort should be concentrated on skill improvement in period 1 when taking into consideration that production might be outsourced at t = 1. As such, the worker faces the following maximisation problem for given e¤ort choices (e 1 ; e 2 ) and compensations (c 1H ; c 2H ).
Noting that @p 0 =@h = e 1=2 2 ( x c 2H ) < 0 gives the following …rst order condition wrt. h
The …rst term in (19) re ‡ects that investing in h in period 1 reduces time available for short-term productive e¤ort, which in turn decreases the probability of realising the high outcome and hence the expected rent in period 1. At the same time, however, investing in h reduces the probability of outsourcing and thus increases the agent's chance to stay on and earn a rent during period 2. This is captured by the last two terms in (19). Therefore, (19) partly re ‡ects the same dynamic as under no outsourcing, yet complicated by factors related to the risk of outsourcing. The intuition behind (19) is therefore best understood when compared to the case of no outsourcing from
c 2H = 0, for which reason I will assume, as a point of reference, that the current choice of investment in …rm-speci…c human capital under outsourcing is equal to that of no outsourcing, i.e. h 
Equation (20) isolates the e¤ects related to the risk of outsourcing; term 1 can be interpreted as measuring the cost of layo¤ to the agent as it represents the probability of outsourcing, evaluated at a current level of …rm-speci…c human capital h N O e1e2 multiplied by the derivative of the rent lost if h is increased and outsourcing is chosen. This term will thus always be negative. Similarly, term 2 can be interpreted as the agent's incentive to stay attractive to the principal by furthering his investment in …rm-speci…c human capital, since it measures how much the probability of outsourcing is reduced for h increased, multiplied by the agent's gain/loss realised if outsourcing is chosen. Depending on the situation at hand, this term can thus be either positive or negative.
On the basis of (20), the following two lemmas can be formulated as supplements to proposition 3. . The reason is that the outsourcing conditions are vastly favourable to the principal, which makes the risk of layo¤ imminent to the agent (high cost of layo¤). Thus, combined with the fairly lucrative severance fee paid out at dismissal (low attractiveness), this in total reduces the agent's incentive to invest in h. Lemma 3.1 captures this reasoning.
However, if the probability of outsourcing, p 0 h N O e1e2 , is relatively low as a result of a small , and the di¤er-ence between the severance fee and the expected rent in period 2 is negative for h . The reason is that the agent has incentive to realise the rent in period 2, e 1=2 2 (1 + h) c 2H 2 , instead of the severance fee, , which can be done by investing more in h to increase attractiveness to the principal and reduce the probability of outsourcing. This concludes the argument for lemma 3.2.
Fundamentally, the cost of layo¤ and the attractiveness depend on and c 2H as seen from term 1 and 2 in (20). Now, imagine a situation where the introduction of outsourcing implies that the cost of layo¤ dominates attractiveness for existing contracts established under no outsourcing. From lemma 3.1 I know that this leads the agent to reduce his investment in …rm-speci…c human capital compared to no outsourcing, h
, which is applicable to the principal only if h is unproductive (e H 1=2). If, however, h is productive (e H > 1=2) it may be in the principal's best interest to limit this reduction by properly combining and c 2H .
I will thus examine how these two variables a¤ect the agent's incentive to invest in h, although the analysis has to be conducted indirectly on the basis of (19) since the explicit solution to h O e1e2 is too complex and provides no meaningful insights. Consequently, given that @p 0 =@c 2H = e 1=2 2 (1 + h) > 0 and @ (@p 0 =@h) =@c 2H = e 1=2 2 > 0, I …nd the following …rst order derivatives of (19) wrt. c 2H and
Intuitively, @ @E U O =@h =@c 2H measures the e¤ect on the expected utility of increasing h when c 2H is increased. Likewise, @ @E U O =@h =@ re ‡ects the e¤ect on the expected utility of increasing h when is increased. Therefore, both comparative statics indirectly provide information about the agent's incentive to decrease or increase his investment in …rm-speci…c human capital. My …ndings are captured in proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4
The combined use of long-term contracts and a severance fee can regulate the worker's incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. (I) Promising a higher bonus in period 2, c 2H , has two opposite directed e¤ ects; it incentivises the worker to further his investment in …rm-speci…c human capital, h, but it also increases the risk of layo¤ , p 0 , which naturally reduces the incentive to undertake the investment. (II) Fortunately, if increasing the level of …rm-speci…c human capital is productive to the company, the increased risk of layo¤ can be mitigated by raising the severance fee, .
Proof. (I): Assume = 0 and consider (21).
For c 2H ! 0 (21) reduces to
Thus, if ! 1 the external supplier is relatively productive, which might create a situation where the outsourcing o¤er will always be the preferred alternative and the agent is left with no incentive to invest in h, if c 2H is increased above 0, @ @ @E U O =@h =@c 2H < 0.
Moreover, if ! 0 the external supplier is relatively unproductive, which might incentivise the agent to invest in h, if c 2H is increased, @ @ @E U O =@h =@c 2H 0. Consequently, c 2H can be used to incentivise the agent if the current level of c 2H is relatively low (! 0).
For c 2H ! 1 (21) will grow negative. That is,
Hence, if c 2H is increased from a current level that is relatively high (! 1), the agent's incentive to invest in h is reduced as the probability of outsourcing, p 0 , is increased.
This concludes the argument for (I).
(II): Assume = 0 and consider (22).
Hence, when c 2H is set too low (< 1=2 x), increasing will only make the agent more reluctant to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital, h, to avoid layo¤.
Hence, when c 2H is set su¢ ciently high ( 1=2 x), increasing will have a positive e¤ect on the agent's incentive to invest in h as this reduces the probability of outsourcing. Under such circumstances can function as a moderator.
This completes the argument for (II).
Thus, proposition 4 reveals how the combined use of c 2H and can incentivise the agent to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. The basic idea for the principal is to provide "pure" incentive to invest in h through c 2H . Yet, c 2H can only be used single-handedly to a certain extent, since increasing c 2H also increases the probability of outsourcing, p 0 . However, if c 2H 1=2 x, can function as a moderator that reduces the probability of outsourcing and provides further scope for strengthening the agent's incentive to invest in h through c 2H .
To …nish the analysis under full commitment, I will make a remark on the principal's cost of initiating learning. Bringing lemma 3.2 and proposition 4 together implies that when …rm-speci…c human capital is productive to the principal (e H > 1=2), the combined use of c 2H and under outsourcing may ensure that the agent's incentive from attractiveness dominates the cost of layo¤. Consequently, the ‡exibility to outsource holds the potential to make the agent undertake learning at a lower cost, since lemma 3.2 asserts that the behavioural e¤ect automatically leads the agent to invest more in …rm-speci…c human capital under outsourcing than under no outsourcing for a given c 2H . Thus, establishing the same investment under outsourcing as under no outsourcing, h
, can be weakly cheaper for the principal as it may require a lower c 2H , possibly in combination with a properly chosen . However, this will only be true if the agent does not deviate from e 1 = e 2 = e H when c 2H is changed and is introduced.
Short-term contracting
Having analysed how incentives to undertake learning can be provided under full contract commitment, I will now assume that the principal can no longer commit to long-term contracts but is instead forced to make use of short-term engagements. In this respect, it is important to understand that under short-term contracting the principal cannot commit to the second period contract at t = 0, meaning that this contract is e¤ectively established and negotiated for the …rst time at t = 1. In what follows the setup and notation from the previous section are kept the same. The only modi…cation is that the second period contract will not be initialised before t = 1.
• γ is determined
• Distribution of price offer is known ( ) 
No outsourcing ‡exibility
In keeping with the structure from section 2, I will return to a situation where no outsourcing ‡exibility is provided to the principal. Still, however, the principal wants to induce e H in both periods, and so he needs to provide the agent with a compensation scheme that encourages such behaviour. Focusing …rst on period 2 and working my way backwards, this implies that the principal's only interest under no contract commitment after observing h at t = 1 is to o¤er a su¢ ciently high compensation to ensure that the agent takes on the high e¤ort level in period 2. The reason is that e¤ort will automatically be channeled towards physical productive e¤ort which is the agent's only alternative in period 2. Formally, using (3) this requires the following inequality to be satis…ed for any given h observed
Hence, only the di¤erence in compensation a¤ects the agent's choice of e¤ort level, leading the principal to select the minimum compensation programme in period 2, (c 2L ; c 2H ), as follows
With this in mind, I can now analyse the agent's incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. Initially, I notice that the …rst-best level of …rm-speci…c human capital under short-term contracting has not changed and is still given by (5). That is, the principal, ceteris paribus, wants to induce a positive level, h N O F B > 0. However, since it is always optimal for the principal, after observing h at t = 1, to o¤er the agent the minimum compensation programme from (23) ; the expected utility in period 2 can be expressed as follows
Equation (24) reveals that the expected utility (expected compensation component) does not depend on the investment in skill improvement in period 1 and implies that the minimum compensation programme in period 2 can never be used to provide incentives to invest in h at t = 0. Put di¤erently, it will never be credible for the principal to promise a higher salary in period 2 at t = 0 than the minimum compensation programme due to contracts being short-term and renegotiated at t = 1. This has implications for the agent's incentive to invest in h as the following proposition 5 reveals.
Proposition 5 In the absence of outsourcing possibilities, the agent will never invest in …rm-speci…c human capital if contracts are renegotiated after each period, h
Proof. The absence of outsourcing possibilities leaves the agent with the following maximisation problem at t = 0
| {z } I n d e p e n d e n t o f h
The …rst order condition with respect to h is
Intuitively, this means that marginally increasing the investment in …rm-speci…c human capital decreases the expected utility, thereby leading the agent to always choose h N O e1H = 0 and only exert physical productive e¤ort a.
From proposition 5 it immediately follows that the miminum compensation programme in period 2 from (23) reduces to
Furthermore, the lack of investments in skill improvement entails that the condition ensuring that the agent picks e H in period 1 is given by
Hence, only the di¤erence in compensation a¤ects the agent's choice of e¤ort, e 1 , and so the principal can induce e H by arranging the minimum compensation programme, (c 1L ; c 1H ), in period 1 as follows
Consequently, the minimum compensation structures ensuring e H in each period, (c 1L ; c 1H ) and (c 2L ; c 2H ), reduce to identical expressions. In total, this implies that the principal's pro…t can be calculated as
Introducing outsourcing ‡exibility
Given that the agent underinvests in …rm-speci…c human capital compared to …rst-best, I will once again introduce outsourcing ‡exibility to study how this a¤ects the situation. With the possibility of outsourcing, the agent's maximisation problem at t = 0 takes the following form
and results in the following …rst order condition wrt. h
T e r m 1 : L o s t r e n t i n p e r i o d 1
T e r m 2 : A t t r a c t i v e n e s s = 0
where @p 0 =@h = e 1=2 H x < 0. Similarly to full commitment, the last term in (26) can be interpreted as the agent's incentive to stay attractive to the principal by investing more in h; @p 0 =@h < 0 represents the reduction in the risk of layo¤ when h increases while E U N O 2 denotes the gain/loss realised in period 2 when the probability of outsourcing decreases.
Using (26) I can derive proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6 (Incentive to stay attractive): Given short-term contracting, (I) If continued in-house production in period 2 is not lucrative,
, the agent will continue to invest nothing in …rm-speci…c human capital, h O HH = 0, even if outsourcing ‡exibility is introduced. (II) If the expected gain from continued inhouse production in period 2 is lucrative, << E U N O 2 , the risk of layo¤ is responsive to skill improvement, @p 0 =@h << 0, and the loss in period 1 rent from skill improvement is small, 1=2e 1=2 H c 1H 0, the worker can have an incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital, h O HH > 0, to stay attractive to the company.
Proof. (I):
Hence, under such circumstances the agent will continue to invest nothing in …rm-spe…ci…c human capital, h O HH = 0, as he receives more from dismissal than from continued in-house production in period 2. That is,
is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the outsourcing ‡exibility to incentivise the agent to invest in h O HH > 0. This completes the argument for (I).
(in-house production is not lucrative) and/or @p 0 =@h = e 1=2 H x 0 (risk of layo¤ is not responsive to skill improvement) and/or 1=2e 1=2 H c 1H >> 0 (big loss in period 1 rent from skill improvement), a situation can happen where
1=2 H c 1H ; thus making (27) negative. In this case the agent's incentive to signal attractiveness is dominated by the loss in period 1 rent and so he invests nothing in …rm-speci…c human capital, h O HH = 0.
(in-house production is lucrative) and/or @p 0 =@h = e 1=2 H
x << 0 (risk of layo¤ is responsive to skill improvement) and/or 1=2e 1=2 H c 1H 0 (small loss in period 1 rent from skill improvement), a situation can happen where
c 1H , thus making (27) positive. In this case the agent has incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital, h O HH > 0. That is, in-house production is so lucrative to the agent that even though the expected rent in period 2 does not explicitly depend on h, the outsourcing ‡exibility induces the agent to invest in h for the very reason that it makes him more attractive to the principal and reduces the risk of layo¤. This concludes the argument for (II).
As a curiosum of proposition 6, it is perhaps surprising that (26) does not depend on the risk of layo¤, p 0 , explicitly but only on the partial derivative, @p 0 =@h, since this implies that the ability of the third party supplier, modelled through , has no in ‡uence on the agent's decision to invest in h. That is, two separate cases where the external supplier is either highly skilled ( high) or poorly skilled ( low) can lead the agent to undertake the same level of skill improvement. This is due to the already mentioned fact that the expected inhouse compensation in period 2 is not a¤ected by the agent's investment, and so, as explained above, the agent's decision to take long-term actions boils down to how much this reduces expected rent in period 1 compared to the proportional gain in period 2. This sums up (I) in lemma 6.1 below.
Clearly, this stands in contrast to the full commitment case in (19) where @E U O =@h depends explicitly on p 0 and thus for the very reason that the expected compensation in period 2 is in ‡uenced by h. Therefore, under such circumstances the two separate scenarios where the external supplier is either highly skilled ( high) or poorly skilled ( low) can never lead the agent to undertake the same level of skill improvement, all else equal. This completes the argument for (II) in lemma 6.1 below.
Lemma 6.1 (I) Under short-term contracting the skills of the third party supplier does not in ‡uence the worker's incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. (II) This is the case under full commitment.
Having clari…ed that the agent can be incentivised to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital under short-term contracting by the introduction of an outsourcing alternative, I will, in keeping with my treatment of the full commitment case in section 2.5.2, study how c 2H and a¤ect the incentive. My …ndings are captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 A combination of short-term contracts and a severance fee cannot be used to incentivise the worker to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. (I) Due to contract commitment not being credible, the bonus o¤ ered after long-term actions have been taken, c 2H , will always be reduced by the company to eliminate the bene…t to the worker of undertaking the investment. (II) Additionally, the severance fee, , reduces the risk of layo¤ and hence the size of the investment in …rm-speci…c human capital required to stay attractive to the company.
Consider the period 2 upstate compensation set at t = 1 from (23)
(1 + h)
For h ! 1, c 2H ! 0. Hence, the principal takes advantage of the agent's …rm-speci…c investment and reduces the bonus in period 2 (c 2H ! 0) according to the level of investment that he observes (h ! 1). In consequence, this eliminates the bene…t to the worker of undertaking the investment to increase productivity in period 2. This concludes the argument for (I).
(II): Consider next the …rst derivative of (15) wrt.
Hence, increasing decreases the risk of layo¤ p 0 , which automatically leads the agent to reduce his investment in h. This can explicitly be seen from (26) by taking the …rst derivative wrt.
That is, a lower skill level is needed for the agent to stay attractive to the principal and keep period 2 production in-house. This completes the argument for (II).
Thus, comparing proposition 4 concerning full commitment to proposition 7 reveals that c 2H and play a very di¤erent role under full commitment than is the case under short-term contracting. Under short-term contracting c 2H cannot be used to incentivise the agent to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital, since he cannot credibly commit to the period 2 contract at t = 0 and hence will always exploit the …rm-speci…city of the agent's investment ex post the investment has been undertaken. In relation to this, cannot play the role of a moderator that reduces the probability of outsourcing as it increases when c 2H is raised. Consequently, neither c 2H nor can be used to strengthen the agent's incentive to invest in h under short-term contracting, which stands in clear contrast to the case of full commitment.
3.3 Does outsourcing ‡exibility bring value to the company under short-term contracting?
Given the analysis above, the natural question is under what circumstances introducing an outsourcing alternative adds or destroys value to the principal. To discuss this, I will initially establish the principal's constrained maximisation problem under outsourcing. Subsequently, I will illustrate my …ndings with carefully chosen examples as no closed form solutions can be derived for the problem.
Since (26) is a concave function with a maximum derived from the following …rst-order condition wrt. h
, in order to ensure the existence of a maximum. Assuming this is the case provides the following optimal level of …rm-speci…c human capital
Hence, for each e¤ort level available at t = 0, the optimal investment in …rm-speci…c human capital can be determined as follows 
Given h O LH and h O HH , it is possible to establish the total expected utility for each e¤ort level
Finally, on the basis of these expressions the principal's constrained maximisation problem can be stated as
In relation to whether the outsourcing ‡exibility is of value to the principal, I immediately observe that when can be chosen unconstrained or is bounded from below, 2 [ min ; 1[ for min 0, the outsourcing ‡exibility can never be a bad to the principal, as he can simply pick arbitrarily large to ensure p 0 = 0 and
if necessary. Thus, the …rst interesting question is if the principal will ever select an optimal severance fee, < 1, that makes the outsourcing ‡exibility valuable compared to the case of no outsourcing. To illustrate that this might happen, I have constructed the following example. Table 1 : The principal chooses a < 1 to maximise his pro…t under outsourcing compared to no outsourcing.
From table 1 it appears that the principal uses the severance fee to limit the agent's incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital ( 0:02). At …rst this might seem counterintuitive as h is productive (e H = 0:595 > 1=2). However, the outsourcing o¤er is relatively lucrative ( = 0:78) and so ex ante the principal is better o¤ incentivising the agent to exert physical e¤ort, a, in period 1 only. In total, the principal strictly bene…ts from the outsourcing possibility since E 3.4 Can outsourcing ‡exibility be a bad to the company under short-term contracting?
The next question I will raise is whether the outsourcing ‡exibility can ever make the principal worse o¤. Based on the analysis in section 3.3 above, only a scenario where the severance fee is capped,
; is of interest in this respect and can make it ambiguous as to whether the outsourcing ‡exibility is of value to the principal. Intuitively, an upper bound on the severance fee might exist for several reasons not modelled in the current setup. Perhaps the principal is interested in maintaining some ‡exibility with regard to future employment, as he expects di¤erent employee skills to be needed for future production. Hence, this may constrain the severance fee that the principal is willing to pay the current worker. Moreover, a too lucrative severance fee might incentivise the agent to behave non-optimally -possibly even destructively -in order to provoke dismissal. Consequently, an upper bound on the severance fee is not unrealistic and will be assumed in what follows next.
If …rm-speci…c human capital is unproductive (e H 1=2), the principal wants to induce h O HH = h F B = 0 which matches with the agent's non-existing incentive to invest in h under short-term contracting, cf. proposition 5. Therefore, the principal will only introduce the outsourcing ‡exibility if the real option value embedded herein is lucrative. Yet, if max << E U N O 2 , the bene…t to the agent from continued in-house production is large, and so a situation may arise where the agent, in spite of being set at max , overinvests heavily in …rm-speci…c human capital in order to make himself su¢ ciently attractive to the principal and reduce the risk of layo¤ (recall (28)). Under such circumstances, the only way the principal can reduce the agent's incentive to invest in h is by increasing c 1H -but if the agent overreacts too much it may be disproportionately expensive to induce a su¢ ciently large reduction in h. Put di¤erently, when …rm-speci…c human capital is unproductive, the behavioural e¤ect (i.e. the agent's investment in h) is always negative and so the outsourcing ‡exibility is only valuable to the principal when the real option value exceeds the value destruction caused by the behavioural e¤ect.
The same line of reasoning can be applied when …rm-speci…c human capital is productive (e H > 1=2) and the principal, all things being equal, wants to induce h > 0 -although matters are slightly complicated. From proposition 5 and 6, I know that h > 0 can never be implemented given no outsourcing but can be ensured under outsourcing. Hence, for small levels of h, the behavioural e¤ect generates value to the principal. Yet, even when …rm-speci…c human capital is productive, a situation may arise where the agent due to max << E U N O 2 overinvests dramatically in h to stay attractive, thereby destroying value. Consequently, determining the value of the outsourcing ‡exibility to the principal boils down to comparing the value of the behavioural e¤ect against the value of the real option. If the agent invests reasonably in …rm-speci…c human capital and the value of the behavioural e¤ect is positive, the outsourcing ‡exibility is per de…nition of value to the principal. If the agent overinvests in …rm-speci…c human capital, thus destroying value to the principal, the outsourcing ‡exi-bility is only bene…cial to the principal when the real option value exceeds the value destruction caused by the behavioural e¤ect. This is illustrated in …gure 5 below for a hypothetical case. These mechanisms can be illustrated with appropriately chosen examples, and so I will initially exemplify that a capped can lead the agent to overinvest in h, thereby turning the outsourcing ‡exibility into a bad. I will focus on the case where h is productive (e H > 1=2) since evidence provided under these conditions immediately implies that a similar example can be constructed when h is unproductive (e H 1=2) and the behavioural e¤ect is always negative. To make the illustration more obvious I shall set max = 0:2. Table 2 : A capped leads the agent to overinvest in h and turns outsourcing ‡exibility into a bad. Table 2 demonstrates that introducing outsourcing ‡exibility is advantageous to the principal when is not constrained. Under such circumstances the principal will choose = 0:8 and realise a pro…t of E Hence, table 2 illustrates that outsourcing ‡exibility need not be bene…cial to the principal when the severance fee is bounded from above.
To show that the possibility of outsourcing can also be a good to the principal even when the severance fee is capped, I only need to set the cap arbitrarily close yet below 0.8. Thus, assume that max = 0:6 and keep the rest of the parameters from the example above unchanged.
increases when the outsourcing alternative is introduced,
Therefore, this example clearly demonstrates that scenarios do exist where outsourcing ‡exibility can create an ex ante win-win situation for both the principal and the agent altogether. This is interesting since outsourcing is normally considered as a bene…t to the company only, while rarely regarded as potentially valuable to the employee as well. However, it is important to stress that the value to the agent only exists expectedly and so what seems lucrative ex ante, might ex post turn out to be a bad if layo¤ is realised.
4 Conclusion Shapiro and Stieglitz (1984) show how the fear of layo¤ (unemployment) can discipline employees not to shirk. In this article I have elaborated on this idea by speci…cally focusing on employee incentives to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital when threatened by layo¤ (outsourcing). However, contrary to Shapiro and Stieglitz (1984) , the rate of unemployment is not the essential disciplining device that corrects behaviour in my model. What drives the incentive is instead the interdependency between the …rm-speci…city of the employee's investment and the risk of layo¤. That is, an investment in …rm-speci…c human capital increases future in-house productivity, yet leaves the employee more exposed to layo¤ since the value in alternative use is minimal. My analysis of this incentive mechanism has been conducted under full commitment as well as short-term contracting, although my main results are related to the latter.
Most importantly, I have shown that a company forced to operate under short-term contracting will always exploit the …rm-speci…city of the employee's competence investment and enforce a salary cut ex post the improvement. Knowing this in advance, the worker does not upgrade his skills, which reduces expected company pro…tability if …rm-speci…c human capital is productive. To overcome this problem, I have proposed the idea of the company introducing outsourcing ‡exibility. Contrary to the obvious assumption that the threat of outsourcing only makes the employee more reluctant to carry out long-term actions, I have shown how the threat of layo¤ can in fact help trigger competence improvements. That is, the risk of discharge makes the employee concerned with realising future rents for which reason he invests in …rm-speci…c human capital to stay attractive to the company (career concerns).
More generally, I have clari…ed how outsourcing comprises two potentially value creating e¤ects to the company; a real option e¤ect that increases with the attractiveness of the outsourcing alternative and a behavioural e¤ect that mimics the changes in employee behaviour caused by the risk of layo¤. Contrary to short-term contracting, outsourcing ‡exibility is not needed under full commitment to incentivise learning since incentives can be regulated through commitment to a certain compensation ex post the investment. Still, based on comparative statics I have explained how outsourcing may be bene…cial for the company to bring about even under full commitment, partly due to the real option e¤ect, but also due to the behavioural e¤ect which reduces the cost of inducing …rm-speci…c investments. In relation to this, I have described how increasing the severance fee under full commitment can help further the employee's incentive to undertake learning when appropriately combined with a compensation ex post the …rm-speci…c investment. The reason is that the severance fee moderates the probability of outsourcing while a higher compensation ex post the investment makes continued in-house production lucrative to the worker. Under short-term contracting the lack of contract commitment destroys the moderating e¤ect of the severance fee and induces the worker to reduce his investment in …rm-speci…c human capital as the severance fee increases.
In practice, and perhaps in particular for companies operating under short-term contracting, the idea of employing outsourcing as an incentive mechanism to ease or trigger …rm-speci…c learning inside the company may thus prove useful. Even when employees are hired continuously on short-term contracts, developing …rm-speci…c skills may be important for company pro…tability. As such, my model shows that if outsourcing ‡exibility is managed properly, the use of short-term contracting is not necessarily restricted to jobs requiring low-skilled labour but can in fact be applied to high-skilled work as well. The real beauty of this is that the competence improvement is private to the employee and comes at no extra cost to the company, since it only hinges on the introduction, but not necessarily the use, of an outsourcing alternative. Actually, not even the employee is automatically harmed by the threat of layo¤. In fact, I have illustrated that the outsourcing ‡exibility can create an ex ante win-win situation where both parties bene…t from the introduction.
Also, considering the discussion in recent years on privatisation of tasks performed by public companies operating in monopoly-like markets characterised by long-term contracts, this article o¤ers an interesting re ‡ection. Proponents of privatisation usually substantiate their arguments with the need to minimise the bureaucracy and ine¢ ciency believed to naturally hamper public companies (Hatry 1985; Morgan and England 1988) ; in my setup this could be modelled as being too costly to provide the employee with su¢ cient incentive to undertake the necessary investment in …rm-speci…c human capital through the ex post investment compensation. Yet, automatically favouring privatisation, and thus simply seeking to replace public companies with private alternatives, may overlook the potential improvement in e¢ ciency that comes about when public employees change their behaviour and invest in …rm-speci…c human capital to meet the threat of replacement. Instead, my analysis suggests that tasks may advantageously be put out to tender so that public and private companies can compete on equal terms.
Having argued for the potential bene…ts of introducing a third party supplier, however, I stress that this is not in all instances the solution to problems regarding long-term actions, and so companies need to apply the principle with caution. Speci…cally, I have illustrated that a severance fee encumbered by an upper bound can turn the outsourcing ‡exibility into a bad for the company if the employee overinvests signi…cantly in …rm-speci…c human capital in order to stay attractive and avoid layo¤. Put di¤erently, when the behavioural e¤ect is highly negative and dominates the real option e¤ect, the outsourcing alternative will harm the company.
On a …nal note, my modelling of investments in …rm-speci…c human capital provides an interesting insight in relation to the continuing debate on fair value accounting (mark-to-market valuation) versus historical cost accounting (original cost) and the trade-o¤ between credibility and relevance (Bleck and Liu 2007) . To brie ‡y explain this, let me consider the valuation of an ongoing project that requires no initial monetary investment by the company but only private investments in …rm-speci…c human capital by the employees. Under fair value accounting, the valuation of the project, and thus the accounting information reported, will come to re ‡ect the employee investment in skill improvement, since the expected cash ‡ow to be discounted re ‡ects the investments of …rm-speci…c human capital through the probabilities. That is, the accounting information provided under fair value accounting (partly) reveals the company's pool of talent. Contrary to this, only the explicit monetary investment of zero will be re ‡ected in the accounting information reported under historical cost accounting, which in consequence implies that the company's pool of talent will never be revealed using this regime. Hence, if expected cash ‡ows are highly responsive to employee investments in …rm-speci…c human capital, this increases the need for relevance and points towards the use of fair value accounting.
